By Brian Matambo | 28 January, 2026
Today I sat down to analyse electoral data particularly for the Copperbelt. Province This information is firmly in the public domain published by the Electoral Commission of Zambia. It is accessible, verifiable, and often ignored. I pay close attention to detail, to numbers, and to the predictable ways human behaviour responds to sentiment. And I would like you to do the same.
Elections are not won by emotion or sentiment alone. I hope this reflection awakens the opposition otherwise we should be honest enough to admit that another five years of UPND governance is a real possibility – UNLESS!
Zambian elections have historically been driven by feeling. Rallies, personalities, slogans, and moments of outrage have shaped political strategy for decades. That era is ending. The 2026 elections will reward planning over passion, arithmetic over applause, and disciplined vote protection over last minute mobilisation. Nowhere is this more evident than on the Copperbelt.
The Copperbelt is often spoken of as a political mood or a symbolic stronghold. That framing is misleading. It is, first and foremost, a mathematical contest. The province has exactly 1,032,253 registered voters, distributed across 22 constituencies, 253 wards, and 1,724 polling stations. Copperbelt has over 13% of all wards in Zambia. This makes it one of the most operationally complex electoral environments in the country. Treating it as a single emotional bloc is a strategic error. It must be understood and engaged as a system.
The data reveals significant internal variation within the province that should directly inform campaign strategy. Chingola Constituency has 69,767 registered voters, making it the largest constituency on the Copperbelt. Kankoyo Constituency in Mufulira has 20,484 registered voters, making it the smallest. That difference alone has implications for how campaigns plan mobilisation, deploy agents, and protect votes.
At ward level, the contrasts are even more instructive. Bupe Ward in Kamfisa Constituency, Kitwe District, has 22,045 registered voters. Lwabufubo Ward in Lufwanyama District has 472 registered voters. Both wards matter. Both must be organised, monitored, and protected. But the number of voters attached to each ward necessarily affects how resources, personnel, and oversight are distributed if a campaign is to operate efficiently and responsibly.
This leads to a straightforward conclusion. Electoral planning must be proportional to voter density. Strategy that ignores numerical weight in favour of uniform treatment is not equitable, it is ineffective.
Chingola, in particular, demands special attention. A constituency with 69,767 registered voters cannot be approached casually. Winning narrowly in such a constituency exposes a campaign to unnecessary risk, whether through administrative error, voter suppression, or post election disputes. High voter density requires early engagement, wide margins, and meticulous vote protection. These outcomes are not produced by rhetoric. They are produced by preparation. This is just an example – but pay attention.
This is where sentimental politics reaches its limits. Messaging alone does not secure ballots. Data does.
Winning in Chingola requires precise knowledge of which wards account for the largest concentrations of voters, which polling stations historically determine turnout patterns, where trained agents must be present throughout the day, and how many votes must be secured before election day to withstand procedural challenges. These are operational questions, not theoretical ones.
With 1,724 polling stations (14.3% of all polling districts in Zambia) across the Copperbelt, vote protection cannot be improvised. Each polling station represents a defined number of registered voters, a historical turnout profile, and a specific administrative context. Without planning at this level, a campaign enters election day without visibility. Sentiment may fill rallies, but only verified numbers secure results.
A data driven approach allows a campaign to prioritise polling stations by voter concentration, deploy agents based on actual electoral weight, anticipate where disputes are most likely to arise, and independently verify results as they are announced. This is standard practice in serious electoral contests globally. Zambia is no exception.
The Copperbelt figures tell a clear story. The province is winnable, but only by campaigns that respect its internal structure and numerical realities. Electoral strength does not reside in labels or assumptions. It resides in registered voters, ward by ward, polling station by polling station.
These figures, published by the Electoral Commission of Zambia, are not abstract statistics. They are a practical guide for 2026.
The opposition faces a choice that can no longer be postponed. It can continue to rely on emotion, hoping enthusiasm will compensate for structural weaknesses. Or it can undertake the quieter, more demanding work of building a data driven campaign architecture that plans early, allocates resources intelligently, and protects every vote with discipline.
On the Copperbelt, especially in constituencies like Chingola, there is no room for ambiguity.
The 2026 elections will not be decided by who speaks the loudest. They will be decided by who plans with precision, counts accurately, and protects the vote without sentimentality.

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